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Abstract
We investigate an extension of Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya’s (2004)
treatment of the evolution of preference to more general, possibly non-
expected utility preferences. Along the lines of their analysis we con-
sider a population of types that is repeatedly and randomly matched
to play the mixed extension of any given symmetric two-player normal-
form game with complete information. In our setup, a type is a generic
best-response correspondence that is assumed to satisfy only standard
assumptions. Preferences evolve according to the “success” of the
player which is determined by the payoff she receives in the game.
As in Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya (2004), the players observe the type
of their opponent and a Nash equilibrium according to their best re-
sponses is played. We show that Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya’s result that
stability of an outcome implies efficiency is robust in this more general
setup. However, in our model we obtain full equivalence between the
two concepts for 2x2 games. We show that efficiency of any strategy
also implies the stability of the outcome that it induces. This is in
contrast to the former work in which only efficiency of a pure strategy
leads to a stable outcome. The result implies the existence of a stable
outcome in any 2x2 game. Considering the class of rank-dependent
expected utility preferences as example we discuss the model’s ability
to embed specific types of non-expected utility theories. Moreover,
we study implications for well-established games like the prisoner’s
dilemma.
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1 Introduction
The evolution of preferences literature bases on the “indirect evolutionary
approch” which originated in the articles of Gu¨th and Yaari (1992) and
Gu¨th (1995). Players from a large population are randomly and repeatedly
matched to play a given two-person normal-form game. In contrast to the
prevailing literature on evolutionary game theory1, where a ’type’ is commit-
ted to play a certain strategy in the game, players are committed to certain
behavior because they are endowed by nature with preferences over the set
of outcomes of the game they are playing. The approach seems to be more
sophisticated because preferences constitute the very basics of economic be-
havior and the choice of a particular strategy should come as a result of the
decision process of a rational agent. As customary, the evoluionary “suc-
cess” of a type is determined by its fitness, i.e. the payoff level that she
receives in the game. In the course of the evolution types with low fitnesses
will be driven out of the population and only the types with the highest
expected fitness will survive. A fundamental discussion of the main features
of these theories is beyond the scope of this work, though.
We investigate the extension of parts of the work of Dekel, Ely and Yi-
lankaya (2004) to a richer set of possible types. As indicated a type in
this setup consists of a preference relation over the set of mixed strategy
profiles of the game. Preferences may very well differ from the true fitness
values and the question arises whether agents that are endowed with prefer-
ences that deviate from payoff maximization can possibly have evolutionary
advantages over payoff maximizers. We assume that preferences are observ-
able, i.e. that in any matching between two types either player knows the
type of her opponent, and we obtain an affirmative answer. Gu¨th (1995) and
Frank (1988) provide justifications for assuming observability. Moreover, if
preferences were not observable, then preferences that maximize true fitness
should perfom most successfully since every type faces the same distribution
of opponents’ actions.
Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya (2004) allow players to have any preference
relation over the outcomes of the given game. However, they require these
preferences to satify the axioms of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944)
Expected Utility Theory in the sense that the agents are assumed to max-
imize their expected utilities in the mixed entension of the game. An in-
dividual might assign different von Neumann-Morgenstern utility values to
two (pure strategy) outcomes which yield equal payoff values though. This
latter seems indeed to be an appropriate and interesting assumption since
it allows agents not only to take their own payoff (or “fitness”) values into
account, but also permits the consideration of the opponent’s payoff, for
instance. Hence, the model may among other things include preferences
1For a textbook introduction to the topic we refer, among others, to Weibull (1995).
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for fairness and altruism2. However, in such an environment it does not
seem obvious to us why these decision makers should necessarily maximize
their expected utilities. In a related paper, Ely and Yilankaya (2001) them-
selves question the appropriateness of this assumption3. The assumption
seems rather to having been made in order to simplify the analysis. In the
past, numerous other authors have provided empirical support for the hy-
pothesis that there actually is frequently observable choice behavior which
systematically violates Expected Utility Theory and in particular its key
component, the independence axiom4. In our setup, we consider the set of
all preference relations on the set of distributions over outcomes, i.e. over
the pairs of mixed strategies, in the mixed extension of the game, explicitly
allowing for non-expected utility maximizing behavior. For technical rea-
sons we impose continuity and quasi-concavity over the set of own actions.
The type space can therefore possibly comprise preferences that conform to
the recent alterative models to Expected Utility Theory. Rationality in our
setup just requires a player in the type space to have a preference relation
on the set of mixed strategy profiles of the game and to choose optimally
in the sense that she always chooses the most preferred strategy available
according to her preference relation. This is far less than claiming expected
utility maximizing behavior. From a decision theorist’s point of view it is
still demanding as we at least require completeness and transitivity.
Along the lines of Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya’s (2004) approach we ana-
lyze the implications of the evolution of preferences. Whenever two types
are matched they play a Nash equilibrium of the game that results from
their respective preferences. An outcome of the evolution is stable if all
types in the corresponding population receive the same fitness and if no
type (a ’mutant’) can enter that population and receive a higher expected
payoff from her matchings than the types already in place. Also, a strat-
egy is efficient if no other strategy can yield a strictly higher fitness when
played against itself. This concept is suggestive because the fitness that the
types in any stable outcome can obtain must be equal to the fitness from
such a symmetric strategy profile. In Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya (2004), this
fitness must be equal to the ’efficient payoff’. This necessity of efficiency for
stability of an outcome is robust to the current extension of the type space.
However, it turns out that in our setup it is also sufficient for 2x2 games: any
efficient strategy (whether pure or mixed) induces a stable outcome. This
essentially differs from the Dekel et al.’s model, where generic 2x2 games
2See among many others, e.g. Levine (1998), Fehr and Schmidt (2000) and Charness
and Rabin (2002).
3“We do not mean to advance to the position that rationality implies an expected
utility representation of preferences” [Ely and Yilankaya (2001, p. 257)].
4Some well-known studies include Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Tversky and Kah-
neman (1992), MacCrimmon and Larsson (1979), Schoemaker (1982) and Camerer and
Ho (1994).
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with an efficient mixed strategy do not have stable outcomes.
In section 2, we present the generalized model and the resulting implica-
tions for the evolution of preferences. Section 3 discusses some examples like
the prisoner’s dilemma. In addition, the model’s ability to embed specific
non-expected utility theories is analyzed. The proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Analysis and Results
The general setup of the model is analogous to Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya
(2004). Occasionally, we use a different or adjusted notation. We consider
the class of symmetric normal-form games with mixed strategies.
Definition 2.1 A two-player normal-form game is a 3-tupel (N = {1, 2},
(A1, A2), (%1,%2)) consisting of (i) a set of players N = {1, 2}, (ii) for
each player i = 1, 2 a non-empty set of actions Ai, and (iii) for each player
i = 1, 2 a preference relation %i over Ai ×A3−i.
Let A¯ = {a1, ..., an} be some finite set. Both players choose mixed strate-
gies over A¯. That is, their action sets consist of the set of all probability
distributions over A¯, i.e. A1 = A2 = ∆ = {(σ
1, ..., σn) ∈ Rn | σi ≥ 0 for all
i = 1, ..., n and
∑n
i=1 σ
i = 1}. Also, we assume the existence of a function
π : A¯ × A¯ → R which is interpreted as the payoff (or “fitness”) function,
with π(a, a′) being the fitness that a player receives if she is playing the pure
strategy a and her opponent is playing strategy a′. The function π is the
same for both players and, thus, the game is henceforth called symmetric5.
The evolutionary success of each player depends on her fitness values in the
game. The fitness function π is extended as normal to the domain of pairs of
mixed strategies, i.e. to ∆×∆, by the taking expected values. The following
matrix is an example of the fitness values in a symmetric 2x2 normal-form
game where A¯ = {A,B}:
A B
A a,a b,c
B c,b d,d
A large population of players is assumed to consist of different types,
and we denote the set of these types by T . In Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya
(2004), the players have expected utility preferences with a von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function u : A¯× A¯→ [0, 1] over pairs of pure strategies.
That is, the authors allow each agent i to have preferences over outcomes
5We are aware that this terminology conflicts with the one in some of the literature
where ’symmetry’ of a game is sometimes defined in terms of the preferences, i.e. Osborne
and Rubinstein (1994). Also, in abuse of notation, we refer to ’the’ symmetric game
although different preferences formally lead to different games, of course.
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which differ from the true payoff values according to π. For type T ∈ T
they have (σT , σ−T ) %T (σ
′
T , σ
′
−T ) if and only if
∑
i
∑
j σ
i
Tσ
j
−TuT (ai, aj) ≥∑
i
∑
j σ
′i
Tσ
′j
−TuT (ai, aj) for all σT , σ−T , σ
′
T , σ
′
−T ∈ ∆.
In our setup, we enrich the type space and allow for non-expected utility
preferences. Our type space T consists of all preference relations over ∆×∆
that are continuous and quasi-concave in the first component.
Definition 2.2 A preference relation %i on Ai × A−i is quasi-concave on
Ai if for every a
∗ ∈ Ai ×A−i the set {ai ∈ Ai : (ai, a
∗
−i) %i a
∗} is convex.
The reason for imposing continuity and quasi-concavity is technical. We
would like to retain Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya’s (2004) assumption that two
players that are matched play a Nash equilibrium of the game. Continuity
and quasi-concavity on the own strategy space of the preference relations
are sort of the minimal requirements that guarantee the existence of a Nash
equilibrium via Kakutani’s fixed point theorem. Continuity basically secures
the existence of a continuous utility function on ∆×∆ representing a player’s
preferences. As we discuss later in this paper, some specific modern alter-
natives to von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944) Expected Utility Theory
unfortunately do not satisfy the quasi-concavity assumption. However, with
such preferences the game between two matched players may fail to have a
Nash equilibrium. Hence, if one wishes to further generalize the model in
order to include such preferences, then other concepts for the outcome of a
matching between two players will be needed.
For convenience, we will often identify a “type”, i.e. a preference relation
over outcomes of the game, with the best-response correspondence it induces
given the agent’s rational behavior.
Definition 2.3 Let type T ∈ T have a preference relation % over ∆ ×
∆. The set-valued function βT : ∆ → ∆ defined by βT (σ−T ) = {σT ∈
∆ | (σT , σ−T ) %T (σ
′
T , σ−T ) for all σ
′
T ∈ ∆} is called type T ’s best-response
correspondence.
Of course, a given best-response correspondence may be induced by dif-
ferent preference relations, but in terms of the evolution these types will
coincide as will become apparent shortly. Therefore, we will henceforth con-
centrate on best responses. The structural assumptions on preferences we
make restrict these best-response correspondences to satisfy the closed-graph
criterion and the image sets to be non-empty and convex-valued.
Definition 2.4 A Nash equilibrium of the two-player normal-form game
(N = {1, 2}, (∆,∆), (%1,%2)) is a pair (σ1, σ2) ∈ ∆ × ∆ such that σi ∈
βi(σ3−i) for i = 1, 2.
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Existence of a Nash equilibrium for any matching of two types in T fol-
lows by Kakutani’s fixed point theorem precisely because of our two struc-
tural assumptions of continuity and quasi-concavity of preferences.
Proposition 2.5 The two-player normal-form game (N = {1, 2}, (∆,∆),
(%T ,%T ′)) played by any two types T, T
′ ∈ T has a Nash equilibrium.
As in Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya (2004), we assume that whenever two
player from the population are matched a Nash equilibrium of ’their’ game
is played. This is, if player T is characterized by a best-response corre-
spondence βT and she is matched with type T
′, then a strategy (σT , σT ′)
is played such that σT ∈ βT (σT ′) and σT ′ ∈ βT ′(σT ). We will not discuss
the economic justification for this assumption. Rather, we refer to the ex-
position in Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya (2004), where an interpretation of the
Nash equilibrium as the outcome of a learning process is provided. Given a
probability distribution µ over the type space T , we denote the support of
µ by C(µ). We assume that C(µ) is finite.
Definition 2.6 An equilibrium configuration is a function b : C(µ)×C(µ)→
∆×∆ such that b(T, T ′) is a Nash equilibrium in the game between T and
T ′ and b1(T, T
′) = b2(T
′, T ) for all T, T ′ ∈ C(µ).
The set of all possible equilibirum configurations given µ is denoted by
B(µ). The latter requirement in Definition 2.6 means that the players do
not know their positions in the game and cannot condition their strategy
on whether they are the row or the column player. In particular, if two
players of the same type are matched, they need to play a symmetric Nash
equilibrium. Under our assumptions, such a symmetric Nash equilibrium
necessarily exists:
Proposition 2.7 The game (N = {1, 2}, (∆,∆), (%,%)), where % is con-
tinuous and quasi-concave in the first component, has a symmetric Nash
equlibrium, i.e. there exists σ% ∈ ∆ such that (σ%, σ%) is a Nash equilib-
rium.
The proof of Proposition 2.7 is Exercise 20.4 in Osborne and Rubinstein
(1994) and is based on Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem.
Given a distribution of types µ and an equilibrium configuration b ∈
B(µ), we can compute the expected fitness of every type T ∈ C(µ):
ΠT (µ | b) =
∑
T ′∈C(µ)
µ(T ′) π(b(T, T ′)).
In the following definition of stability we use T to also denote a degen-
erate distribution that only consists of T s.
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Definition 2.8 An outcome x is stable (with µ and b ∈ B(µ)) if x is the
outcome induced by the equilibrium configuration b under the distribution of
types µ such that ΠT (µ | b) = ΠT ′(µ | b) for all T, T
′ ∈ C(µ) and we have:
∀T ∈ T ∃ǫ′ > 0 ∀ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ′) ∀Tµ ∈ C(µ) ∀b¯ ∈ B((1− ǫ)µ+ ǫT | b) :
ΠTµ((1− ǫ) µ+ ǫ T | b¯) ≥ ΠT ((1− ǫ) µ+ ǫ T | b¯),
where B((1 − ǫ)µ + ǫT | b) = {b˜ ∈ B((1 − ǫ)µ + ǫT ) : b˜(T1, T2) = b(T1, T2)
whenever T1, T2 ∈ C(µ)}.
Note that this stability concept is static. Dynamic evolutionary processes
that lead to a distribution of types associated with a stable outcome are not
explicitly considered here.
As Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya (2004) we instead focus on characterizing
stable outcomes using the concept of efficiency. A (mixed) strategy in a
symmetric normal-form game is called efficient if no other strategy yields a
higher fitness when played against itself. For a detailled discussion of the
meaningfulness of this concept we again refer to the exposition in Dekel, Ely
and Yilankaya (2004).
Definition 2.9 Let G be any finite symmetric normal-form game. A strat-
egy σ∗ ∈ ∆ is called efficient if π(σ∗, σ∗) ≥ π(σ, σ) for all σ ∈ ∆.
Since ∆ is compact and π is continuous, any finite symmetric normal-
form game has an efficient strategy σ∗. We abbreviate π(σ∗, σ∗) by π∗. By
definition, π∗ is uniquely determined.
Proposition 2.10 Let G be any finite symmetric normal-form game. Sup-
pose that x is stable with a distribution µ and an equilibrium configuration
b ∈ B(µ). Then, we have ΠT (µ | b) = π(b(T, T
′)) = π∗ for all T, T ′ ∈ C(µ).
Proof. The proofs of Propositions 1 and 3 in Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya
(2004) can be directly brought forward to our setup. 2
Proposition 2.10 shows that in a stable outcome all types in the distribu-
tion must receive the same fitness from any matching with any other type.
Also, this fitness value must be equal to the efficient payoff. The result illus-
trates the robustness of our setup with respect to the efficiency implications
of stability as shown in Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya (2004). The intuition is
that with our richer type space there are more types that could possibly
invade the population. Hence, stability is now even a stronger requirement
as the conditions in Definition 2.8 have to hold against more potential en-
trants. Therefore, the expected fitness that every type needs to obtain in a
stable outcome cannot be lower than before. It will be more interesting to
see what we can say about sufficient conditions for stability. As we will see
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shortly, the results change substantially here, in particular regarding stabil-
ity implications of efficient mixed strategies in 2x2 games. The results for
pure strategies can be carried over.
Proposition 2.11 Let G be any symmetric 2x2 normal form-game. If a
pure strategy ai ∈ ∆ is efficient and π(ai, ai) > π(aj , ai) for all pure strate-
gies aj 6= ai in ∆, then (ai, ai) is stable.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 2 in Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya (2004)
can be directly brought forward to our setup. 2
In the case of 2x2 games, we conveniently identify a strategy with an
element σ of [0, 1]. It is meant as a shortcut for (σ, 1−σ), where A is played
with probability σ and B is played with probability 1− σ. In the following,
we assume w.l.o.g. that a ≥ d, where the fitness values in the 2x2 game are
as in the example given at the beginning of this section.
Proposition 2.12 Let G be any symmetric 2x2 normal form-game. Sup-
pose that A is efficient. Then, the outcome (a, a) is stable.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 4 a) in Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya (2004)
can be directly brought forward to our setup. 2
If, in addition, some strategy σ∗ 6= A is efficient, then we must necessarily
have π(σ∗, σ∗) = π(A,A). Next we show that in this case the outcome
induced by (σ∗, σ∗) is also stable.
Proposition 2.13 Let G be any symmetric 2x2 normal-form game such
that A is efficient. Then, if σ∗ ∈ ∆ is efficient, the outcome induced by
(σ∗, σ∗) is stable.
Proof. See Appendix. 2
Stability of outcomes induced by an efficient mixed strategy conditional
on the co-existence of the efficient pure strategy A is not discussed in Propo-
sition 4 in Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya (2004). However, an example shows
that in their setup such an outcome need not necesserily be stable. Consider
the following 2x2 symmetric normal-form game:
A B
A 1,1 0,2
B 2,0 1,1
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We have π(σ, σ) = σ2 + (1 − σ)2 + 2σ(1 − σ) = 1 for all σ ∈ [0, 1].
Therefore, all strategies are efficient. Let σ′ ∈ (0, 1). For any expected
utility maximizer, we must have β(σ′) = [0, 1] in order to obtain the outcome
induced by (σ′, σ′). Consider an entrant with the following best-response
correspondence:
βe(σ) =
{
[0, 1] if σ = 1
1 otherwise
.
This best-response correspondence comes from expected utility preferences.
Hence, the entrant is in Dekel et al.’s type space. Assume that in the post-
entry equilibrium configuration b¯ the equilibrium that is played when an
entrant and any incumbent are matched is (σe, σi) = (σ
′, 1). The entrant’s
expected fitness from these matches is σ′+2(1−σ′) > 1 = π(σ′, σ′). Hence,
if entering in any proportion, the entrant can successfully invade the popu-
lation. The outcome induced by (σ′, σ′) is not stable. Note that theses ar-
guments for non-stability can be brought forward to all cases of co-existence
of efficient mixed and efficient pure strategies unless a = b = c = d.
In contrast to Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya (2004), the stabibilty implication
can generally be carried over to all efficient mixed strategies in our setup.
The co-efficiency of the pure strategy A is not required.
Proposition 2.14 Let G be any symmetric 2x2 normal form-game such
that A is not efficient. Suppose that σ∗ ∈ ∆ is efficient. Then, the outcome
induced by (σ∗, σ∗) is stable.
Proof. See Appendix. 2
Combining Propositions 2.12, 2.13 and 2.14 we have the following result.
Theorem 2.15 Let G be any symmetric 2x2 normal-form game. If σ∗ ∈ ∆
is efficient, then the outcome induced by (σ∗, σ∗) is stable.
Every finite symmetric normal-form game has an efficient strategy. The
following existence result for stable outcomes is now an immediate conse-
quence of Theorem 2.15.
Corollary 2.16 Any symmetric 2x2 normal-form game has a stable out-
come.
In contrast to Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya’s (2004) setup with expected
utility maximizing agents, in which generic 2x2 games with an efficient mixed
strategy do not have a stable outcome, existence is always warranted in our
non-expected utility setup.
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3 Examples
In this section we illustrate the significance of the results considering some
examples. First, we look at a classical prisoner’s dilemma game, where the
fitness values are given as follows:
A B
A 3,3 0,10
B 10,0 1,1
Strategy A (Cooperation) is strictly dominated by B (Defection). By
straightforward calculation, one finds that the unique efficient strategy is
σ∗ = 23 . The associated payoff is π(σ
∗, σ∗) = 323 . Note that this fitness
is strictly higher than 3, the fitness obtained through cooperation. This is
naturally true since A is not efficient. We can clearly see that in the pris-
oner’s dilemma neither an outcome induced by a population of cooperating
players nor one induced by a population of defecting players can be stable.
This is also true in Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya’s (2004) model. However, in
their setup this game does not have a stable outcome (Proposition 4b in
Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya (2004)). Corollary 2.16 shows the existence of
such stable outcome in the more general model. Stability is, for instance,
induced by a monomorphic population of types that always play B if their
opponent is not playing the efficient strategy σ∗ and that are indifferent be-
tween all strategies in [0, σ∗] if her opponent is playing σ∗. The associated
equilibrium configuration is obviously (σ∗, σ∗). We refer to case iii) of the
proof of Proposition 2.14 in the Appendix for the details.
At this point, we would like to remark that the type space that we have
chosen in our setup is very general and permits a large range of preferences
to occur in the population. Non-expected utility maximizing behavior is
explicitly embedded. However, we assume that preferences are continuous
and satisfy the quasi-concavity condition. The latter is crucial since is still
excludes some types of preferences that have been developed as alterna-
tives to von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944) Expected Utility Theory.
To illustrate this, consider decision makers with Rank-dependent Expected
Utility (RDEU) preferences6. For simplicity, assume that the utility func-
tion over outcomes coincides with the fitness function. That is, the agents’
preferences satisfy the conditions of Yaari’s (1987) Dual Theory of Choice
under Risk. The preference relation %Y of such a player in a game is then
represented by a strictly increasing, continuous function f : [0, 1] → [0, 1]
6RDEU models have been first introduced by Quiggin (1982). Axiomatizations have
been provided by Wakker (1994) and Yaari (1987), the latter with a linear utility function
over the set of outcomes that coincides with the fitness function.
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with f(0) = 0 and f(1) = 1 such that (σY , σ−Y ) %Y (σ
′
Y , σ
′
−Y ) if and
only if
∑n2
i=1 π(a¯i)[f(
∑n2
j=i pj) − f(
∑n2
j=i+1 pj)] ≥
∑n2
i=1 π(a¯i)[f(
∑n2
j=i p
′
j) −
f(
∑n2
j=i+1 p
′
j)], where a¯i = (ak, al) for some k, l ∈ {1, ..., n} (and a¯i 6= a¯i′ for
i 6= i′) such that π(a¯1) ≤ ... ≤ π(a¯n2) and pi = σ
k
Y σ
l
−Y for the specified k
and l. The a¯is are just an re-ordering of the outcomes in terms of the result-
ing fitness values. Such an agent is simply maximizing her rank-dependent
expected fitness.
Consider a symmetric normal-form game where no two pure strategy
pairs receive the same fitness value. If the preferences of all such players are
represented by strictly convex fs, then the resulting game which is played
by any two of these players can only have pure strategy Nash equilibria
(Ritzberger (1996), Proposition 1). For example, consider the 2x2 game
with the following fitness values:
A B
A 1,1 20,20
B 10,10 0,0
For any two players with preferences as just described, the game has two
Nash equilibria, (A,B) and (B,A). However, it has no symmetric Nash equi-
librium. That means that in order to play a Nash equilibrium two players of
the same type would need to condition their choice on their position in the
game when matched with each other, which contradicts our assumption that
they cannot. The reason for the non-existence of mixed strategy equilibria
is that the players are not willing to randomize between the pure strategies.
The image sets of the best-response correspondences are not convex-valued.
Obviously, the requirements of Kakutani’s fixed point theorem are not ful-
filled. Note that the case of convex probability transformation functions
corresponds to a situation where the decision makers are risk-averse, in any
sense of the world7. The existence of the appropriate Nash equilibria can be
guaranteed only for types with (weakly) concave probability transformation
functions. We omit the details. But with concave transformation functions
none of the agents can actually be risk-averse. Indeed, a setup with (possi-
bly) risk-averse agents would probably be the more interesting case. If one
aims at embedding types with such preferences, concepts for the outcome
of a matching of two types other than Nash equilibrium will be needed. Al-
ternatively, the assumption that the players cannot condition their choices
on their positions in the game must be relaxed.
7For the argument see Yaari (1987) and Ro¨ell (1987).
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4 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.13. For lucidity define π∗ ≡ π(σ∗, σ∗). We con-
sider several possible cases with monomorphic populations, respectively, and
equilibrium configurations b such two members of the respective population
play the equilibrium (σ∗, σ∗) whenever they are matched.
In the following steps, we assume that the fitness values of the game are
given as follows:
A B
A a,a b,c
B c,b d,d
Define f : [0, 1]→ R by f(σ) = σ2a+σ(1−σ)(b+c)+(1−σ)2d−a. Since
A and σ∗ are efficient, we have f ≤ 0 and f(1) = 0 = f(σ∗). Rewriting f
leads to f(σ) = (a+ d− b− c) σ2 + (b+ c− 2d) σ + d− a.
If σ∗ = 0, then we must have a = d and f ≤ 0 implies 2a = a+d ≥ b+c.
If σ∗ ∈ (0, 1), then 1 and σ∗ can only both maximize f if f = 0, in which
case all strategies σ ∈ [0, 1] are efficient. Consequently, we have a = d and
b+c = 2a. Hence, we need only consider the cases where a = d and 2a ≥ b+c.
i) a = d = b: First, assume that σ∗ ∈ (0, 1). We must have b + c = 2d
which implies that a = b = c = d. The outcome induced by (σ∗, σ∗) is
trivially stable, for instance with a monomorphic population of types T (σ∗)
that always play σ = σ∗.
Second, assume that σ∗ = 0, i.e. B is efficient. Then, we have 2a =
a + d ≥ b + c, i.e. a ≥ c. Consider a monomorphic population of types
T (0, 1) with the following best-response correspondence:
β0,1(σ) =
{
[0, 1] if σ = 0
1 otherwise
.
Consider any entrant in the population such that in b¯ the equilibrium which
is played between an entrant and an incumbent is (σe, σi) and the equilibrium
between two entrants is (σ3, σ3). The expected fitnesses of the incumbent
and the entrant are, respectively,
Π0,1((1− ǫ) T (0, 1) + ǫ T (e) | b¯) = (1− ǫ) π(σ
∗, σ∗) + ǫ π(σi, σe)
and
Πe((1− ǫ) T (0, 1) + ǫ T (e) | b¯) = (1− ǫ) π(σe, σi) + ǫ π(σ3, σ3).
If σe 6= 0, then σi = 1. Hence, π(σe, σi) = σe a + (1 − σe) c ≤ a = π
∗ and
π(σi, σe) = σe a+(1−σe) b = a = π
∗. Therefore Π0,1(.) = π
∗ ≥ Πe(.) for all
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ǫ (remember that π(σ3, σ3) ≤ π
∗ by the definition of efficiency). If σe = 0,
then π(σe, σi) = σic+ (1− σi)d ≤ d = π
∗ and π(σi, σe) = σib+ (1− σi)d =
a = π∗. Again, the expected fitness of the entrant never exceeds that of the
incumbent.
ii) a = d > b: First, assume that σ∗ ∈ (0, 1). We have c = 2a − b > a.
Consider a monomorphic population of types T (0, σ∗) with the following
best-response correspondence:
β0,σ∗(σ) =
{
[0, σ∗] if σ = σ∗
0 otherwise
.
Consider any entrant in the population such that in b¯ the equilibrium which
is played between an entrant and an incumbent is (σe, σi) and the equilibrium
between two entrants is (σ3, σ3). The expected fitnesses of the incumbent
and the entrant are, respectively,
Π0,σ∗((1− ǫ) T (0, σ
∗) + ǫ T (e) | b¯) = (1− ǫ) π(σ∗, σ∗) + ǫ π(σi, σe)
and
Πe((1− ǫ) T (0, σ
∗) + ǫ T (e) | b¯) = (1− ǫ) π(σe, σi) + ǫ π(σ3, σ3).
If σe 6= σ
∗, then σi = 0. Hence, π(σe, σi) = σe b+ (1− σe) d ≤ d = π
∗ and
π(σi, σe) = σe c + (1 − σe) d ≥ d = π
∗. Therefore Π0,σ∗(.) ≥ π
∗ ≥ Πe(.)
for all ǫ (remember that π(σ3, σ3) ≤ π
∗ by the definition of efficiency). If
σe = σ
∗, then
π(σe, σi) = σi [σ
∗a+ (1− σ∗)c] + (1− σi) [σ
∗b+ (1− σ∗)d]
≤ π∗
and
π(σi, σe) = σi [σ
∗a+ (1− σ∗)b] + (1− σi) [σ
∗c+ (1− σ∗)d]
≥ π∗,
for any σi ∈ [0, σ
∗] (with equalities for σi = σ
∗). Again, the expected fitness
of the entrant never exceeds that of the incumbent.
Second, assume that σ∗ = 0, i.e. B is efficient. We have that (d, d) is
stable with a monomorphic population of T (0)s, i.e. with types that always
play B. For, an entrant can obtain a payoff of at least π∗ from a matching
with a T (0) only if she plays σe = 0. But in this case the incumbent also
receives π∗ from this matching and the entrant cannot succesfully invade
the population.
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iii) b > a = d: First, assume that σ∗ ∈ (0, 1). We have c = 2a − b < a.
Consider a monomorphic population of types T (σ∗, 1) with the following
best-response correspondence:
βσ∗,1(σ) =
{
[σ∗, 1] if σ = σ∗
1 otherwise
.
Consider any entrant in the population such that in b¯ the equilibrium which
is played between an entrant and an incumbent is (σe, σi) and the equilibrium
between two entrants is (σ3, σ3). The expected fitnesses of the incumbent
and the entrant are, respectively,
Πσ∗,1((1− ǫ) T (σ
∗, 1) + ǫ T (e) | b¯) = (1− ǫ) π(σ∗, σ∗) + ǫ π(σi, σe)
and
Πe((1− ǫ) T (σ
∗, 1) + ǫ T (e) | b¯) = (1− ǫ) π(σe, σi) + ǫ π(σ3, σ3).
If σe 6= σ
∗, then σi = 1. Hence, π(σe, σi) = σe a+ (1− σe) c ≤ a = π
∗ and
π(σi, σe) = σe a + (1 − σe) b ≥ a = π
∗. Therefore Πσ∗,1(.) ≥ π
∗ ≥ Πe(.)
for all ǫ (remember that π(σ3, σ3) ≤ π
∗ by the definition of efficiency). If
σe = σ
∗, then
π(σe, σi) = σi [σ
∗a+ (1− σ∗)c] + (1− σi) [σ
∗b+ (1− σ∗)d]
≤ π∗
and
π(σi, σe) = σi [σ
∗a+ (1− σ∗)b] + (1− σi) [σ
∗c+ (1− σ∗)d]
≥ π∗,
for any σi ∈ [σ
∗, 1] (with equalities for σi = σ
∗). The expected fitness of the
entrant never exceeds that of the incumbent.
Second, assume that σ∗ = 0, i.e. B is efficient. With similar arguments
as in the case σ∗ ∈ (0, 1) one verifies that (d, d) is stable with a monomorphic
population of T (0, 1)s, i.e. with the following best-response correspondence:
β(σ) =
{
[0, 1] if σ = 0
1 otherwise
.
This gives us the desired result. 2
Proof of Proposition 2.14. Since A is not efficient, B cannot be
efficient either because we have assumed that a ≥ d. Hence, σ∗ ∈ (0, 1). By
definition, σ∗ = argmaxσ∈[0,1] σ
2 a + σ(1 − σ) (b + c) + (1 − σ)2 d, which
yields
σ∗ =
b+ c− 2d
2(b+ c− a− d)
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via the first-order condition. The efficient payoff is
π∗ ≡ π(σ∗, σ∗) = (σ∗)2 a+ σ∗(1− σ∗) (b+ c) + (1− σ∗)2 d
= d+
(b+ c− 2d)2
4(b+ c− a− d)
.
In the following, we consider populations, in each of which (σ∗, σ∗) is an
equilibrium that is played in b whenever two incumbents are matched. We
show that in a each such case no type can successfully invade the respective
population. We consider several possible cases:
i) a ≥ c, d ≥ b: Since a = max{a, b, c, d}, we have that A is efficient.
Thus, this case cannot occur.
ii) a ≥ c, b > d: If c ≥ b, then a = max{a, b, c, d}, and therefore A is
efficient. This case cannot occur. Hence, we must have b > c. Consider a
monomorphic population of types T (σ∗, 1) with the following best-response
correspondence:
βσ∗,1(σ) =
{
[σ∗, 1] if σ = σ∗
1 otherwise
.
Consider any entrant in the population such that in b¯ the equilibrium which
is played between an entrant and an incumbent is (σe, σi) and the equilibrium
between two entrants is (σ3, σ3). The expected fitnesses of the incumbent
and the entrant are, respectively,
Πσ∗,1((1− ǫ) T (σ
∗, 1) + ǫ T (e) | b¯) = (1− ǫ) π(σ∗, σ∗) + ǫ π(σi, σe)
and
Πe((1− ǫ) T (σ
∗, 1) + ǫ T (e) | b¯) = (1− ǫ) π(σe, σi) + ǫ π(σ3, σ3).
If σe 6= σ
∗, then σi = 1. Hence, π(σe, σi) = σe a + (1 − σe) c ≤ a < π
∗.
We can find a sufficiently small ǫ′ > 0 such that for all ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ′) we have
Πσ∗,1(.) > Πe(.). If σe = σ
∗, then σi ∈ [σ
∗, 1] and
π(σe, σi) = σi [σ
∗a+ (1− σ∗)c] + (1− σi) [σ
∗b+ (1− σ∗)d]
≤ π∗,
and
π(σi, σe) = σi [σ
∗a+ (1− σ∗)b] + (1− σi) [σ
∗c+ (1− σ∗)d]
≥ π∗,
for any σi ∈ [σ
∗, 1] (with equalities for σi = σ
∗). The expected fitness of
the entrant never exceeds that of the incumbent. With this population the
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outcome induced by (σ∗, σ∗) is therefore stable.
iii) c > a ≥ d ≥ b: Consider a monomorphic population of types T (0, σ∗)
with the following best-response correspondence:
β0,σ∗(σ) =
{
[0, σ∗] if σ = σ∗
0 otherwise
.
Consider any entrant in the population such that in b¯ the equilibrium which
is played between an entrant and an incumbent is (σe, σi) and the equilibrium
between two entrants is (σ3, σ3). The expected fitnesses of the incumbent
and the entrant are, respectively,
Π0,σ∗((1− ǫ) T (0, σ
∗) + ǫ T (e) | b¯) = (1− ǫ) π(σ∗, σ∗) + ǫ π(σi, σe),
and
Πe((1− ǫ) T (0, σ
∗) + ǫ T (e) | b¯) = (1− ǫ) π(σe, σi) + ǫ π(σ3, σ3).
If σe 6= σ
∗, then σi = 0. Hence, π(σe, σi) = σe b + (1 − σe) d ≤ a < π
∗.
We can find a sufficiently small ǫ′ > 0 such that for all ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ′) we have
Π0,σ∗(.) > Πe(.). If σe = σ
∗, then σi ∈ [0, σ
∗] and
π(σe, σi) = σi [σ
∗a+ (1− σ∗)c] + (1− σi) [σ
∗b+ (1− σ∗)d]
≤ π∗
and
π(σi, σe) = σi [σ
∗a+ (1− σ∗)b] + (1− σi) [σ
∗c+ (1− σ∗)d]
≥ π∗
for any σi ∈ [0, σ
∗] (with equalities for σi = σ
∗). The expected fitness of
the entrant never exceeds that of the incumbent. With this population the
outcome induced by (σ∗, σ∗) is therefore stable.
iv) c > a, b > d, b = c: This is the only case (i.e., a non-generic Hawk-
Dove game) in which in Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya’s (2004) setup efficiency
of a mixed strategy implies stability. Their “stable” population can be used
here as well. Consider a monomorphic population of types T (0, σ∗, 1) with
the following best-response correspondence:
β0,σ∗,1(σ) =


1 if σ > σ∗
[0, 1] if σ = σ∗
0 if σ < σ∗
.
Consider any entrant in the population such that in b¯ the equilibrium which
is played between an entrant and an incumbent is (σe, σi) and the equilibrium
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between two entrants is (σ3, σ3). The expected fitnesses of the incumbent
and the entrant are, respectively,
Π0,σ∗,1((1− ǫ) T (0, σ
∗, 1) + ǫ T (e) | b¯) = (1− ǫ) π(σ∗, σ∗) + ǫ π(σi, σe),
and
Πe((1− ǫ) T (0, σ
∗, 1) + ǫ T (e) | b¯) = (1− ǫ) π(σe, σi) + ǫ π(σ3, σ3).
If σe < σ
∗, then σi = 0. Hence,
π(σe, σi) = σe b+ (1− σe) d
< σ∗ b+ (1− σ∗) d
= d+ σ∗(b− d)
= d+
2b− 2d
2(2b− a− d)
(b− d)
= d+
(2b− 2d)2
4(2b− a− d)
= π∗.
If σe > σ
∗, then σi = 1. Hence,
π(σe, σi) = σe a+ (1− σe) c
< σ∗ a+ (1− σ∗) b
= π∗
(the latter equality holds because we have σ∗ b+(1−σ∗) d = π∗ = σ∗ [σ∗a+
(1−σ∗)c]+(1−σ∗) [σ∗b+(1−σ∗)d]). In either case, we can find a sufficiently
small ǫ′ > 0 such that for all ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ′) we have Π0,σ∗,1(.) > Πe(.). If σe = σ
∗,
then σi ∈ [0, 1] and we have
π(σe, σi) = π(σ
∗, σi)
= σi [σ
∗a+ (1− σ∗)c] + (1− σi) [σ
∗b+ (1− σ∗)d]
= π∗
and
π(σi, σe) = σi [σ
∗a+ (1− σ∗)b] + (1− σi) [σ
∗c+ (1− σ∗)d]
= π∗
since b = c. The expected fitness of the entrant never exceeds that of the
incumbent. With this population the outcome induced by (σ∗, σ∗) is there-
fore stable.
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v) b > c > a > d, c ≤ π∗: Consider a monomorphic population of types
T (σ∗, 1) with the following best-response correspondence:
βσ∗,1(σ) =
{
[σ∗, 1] if σ = σ∗
1 otherwise
.
Consider any entrant in the population such that in b¯ the equilibrium which
is played between an entrant and an incumbent is (σe, σi) and the equilibrium
between two entrants is (σ3, σ3). The expected fitnesses of the incumbent
and the entrant are, respectively,
Πσ∗,1((1− ǫ) T (σ
∗, 1) + ǫ T (e) | b¯) = (1− ǫ) π(σ∗, σ∗) + ǫ π(σi, σe),
and
Πe((1− ǫ) T (σ
∗, 1) + ǫ T (e) | b¯) = (1− ǫ) π(σe, σi) + ǫ π(σ3, σ3).
If σe 6= σ
∗, then σi = 1. Hence, π(σe, σi) = σe a + (1 − σe) c ≤ c ≤ π
∗
with equality only if σe = 0. However, then π(σi, σe) = b > π
∗ and the
expected fitness of the incumbent would therefore be higher than that of
the entrant, whose expected payoff is π∗ at most. If σe 6= σ
∗ and σe 6= 0,
then π(σe, σi) < c ≤ π
∗ and we can find a sufficiently small ǫ′ > 0 such that
for all ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ′) we have Πσ∗,1(.) > Πe(.). If σe = σ
∗, then σi ∈ [σ
∗, 1] and
π(σe, σi) = σi [σ
∗a+ (1− σ∗)c] + (1− σi) [σ
∗b+ (1− σ∗)d]
≤ π∗
and
π(σi, σe) = σi [σ
∗a+ (1− σ∗)b] + (1− σi) [σ
∗c+ (1− σ∗)d]
≥ π∗
for any σi ∈ [σ
∗, 1] (with equalities for σi = σ
∗). The expected fitness of
the entrant never exceeds that of the incumbent. With this population the
outcome induced by (σ∗, σ∗) is therefore stable.
vi) c > b > a > d, b ≤ π∗: Consider a monomorphic population of types
T (0, σ∗) with the following best-response correspondence:
β0,σ∗(σ) =
{
[0, σ∗] if σ = σ∗
0 otherwise
.
Consider any entrant in the population such that in b¯ the equilibrium which
is played between an entrant and an incumbent is (σe, σi) and the equilibrium
between two entrants is (σ3, σ3). The expected fitnesses of the incumbent
and the entrant are, respectively,
Π0,σ∗((1− ǫ) T (0, σ
∗) + ǫ T (e) | b¯) = (1− ǫ) π(σ∗, σ∗) + ǫ π(σi, σe),
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and
Πe((1− ǫ) T (0, σ
∗) + ǫ T (e) | b¯) = (1− ǫ) π(σe, σi) + ǫ π(σ3, σ3).
If σe 6= σ
∗, then σi = 0. Hence, π(σe, σi) = σe b + (1 − σe) d ≤ b ≤ π
∗
with equality only if σe = 1. However, then π(σi, σe) = c > π
∗ and the
expected fitness of the incumbent would therefore still be higher than that
of the entrant, whose expected payoff is π∗ at most. If σe 6= σ
∗ and σe 6= 1,
then π(σe, σi) < b ≤ π
∗ and we can find a sufficiently small ǫ′ > 0 such that
for all ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ′) we have Π0,σ∗(.) > Πe(.). If σe = σ
∗, then σi ∈ [0, σ
∗] and
π(σe, σi) = σi [σ
∗a+ (1− σ∗)c] + (1− σi) [σ
∗b+ (1− σ∗)d]
≤ π∗
and
π(σi, σe) = σi [σ
∗a+ (1− σ∗)b] + (1− σi) [σ
∗c+ (1− σ∗)d]
≥ π∗
for any σi ∈ [0, σ
∗] (with equalities for σi = σ
∗). The expected fitness of
the entrant never exceeds that of the incumbent. With this population the
outcome induced by (σ∗, σ∗) is therefore stable.
The remaining cases are b > c > π∗ > a > d and c > b > π∗ > a > d. In
the following, define σ¯ such that π∗ = σ¯a + (1 − σ¯)c, i.e. σ¯ = c−pi
∗
c−a
. First,
we investigate the algebraic sign of σ¯ − σ∗. We have
4(c− a)(b+ c− a− d)(σ¯ − σ∗)
= 4(c− a)(b+ c− a− d)
(
c− π∗
c− a
−
b+ c− 2d
2(b+ c− a− d)
)
= 4(c− d)(b+ c− a− d)− (b+ c− 2d)2 − 2(b+ c− 2d)(c− a)
= (c− b)(b+ c− 2a).
As c > a, b + c > a+ d and b + c > 2a it follows that σ¯ > σ∗ if c > b and
σ¯ < σ∗ if b > c.
Further define σ¯ such that π∗ = σ¯b+ (1− σ¯)d, i.e. σ¯ = pi
∗−d
b−d
. Again, we
investigate the algebraic sign of σ¯ − σ¯ and have
(c− a)(b− d)(σ¯ − σ¯) = (π∗ − d)(c− a)− (c− π∗)(b− d)
=
1
4
(b− c)2 > 0.
As c > a and b > d, we conclude that σ¯ > σ¯.
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vii) b > c > π∗ > a > d: Consider a monomorphic population of types
T (0, σ¯, σ∗, 1) with the following best-response correspondence:
β0,σ¯,σ∗,1(σ) =


1 if σ > σ¯ and σ 6= σ∗
[σ∗, 1] if σ = σ∗
[0,1] if σ = σ¯
0 if σ < σ¯
.
As b > c we know from above that σ∗ > σ¯. Hence, there is a type with
this best-response correspondence in our type space T . For, β(σ) is non-
empty and convex for all σ ∈ [0, 1], we have σ∗ ∈ β(σ∗), and the closed
graph criterion is also satisfied (β is upper hemi-continuous). Consider any
entrant in the population such that in b¯ the equilibrium which is played
between an entrant and an incumbent is (σe, σi) and the equilibrium between
two entrants is (σ3, σ3). The expected fitnesses of the incumbent and the
entrant are, respectively,
Π0,σ¯,σ∗,1((1− ǫ) T (0, σ¯, σ
∗, 1) + ǫ T (e) | b¯) = (1− ǫ) π(σ∗, σ∗) + ǫ π(σi, σe),
and
Πe((1− ǫ) T (0, σ¯, σ
∗, 1) + ǫ T (e) | b¯) = (1− ǫ) π(σe, σi) + ǫ π(σ3, σ3).
If σe < σ¯, then σi = 0. Hence,
π(σe, σi) = σe b+ (1− σe) d
< σ¯ b+ (1− σ¯) d
< σ¯ b+ (1− σ¯) d
= π∗.
If σe > σ¯ and σe 6= σ
∗, then σi = 1. Hence,
π(σe, σi) = σe a+ (1− σe) c
< σ¯ a+ (1− σ¯) c
= π∗.
In either case, we can find a sufficiently small ǫ′ > 0 such that for all ǫ ∈
(0, ǫ′) we have Π0,σ¯,σ∗,1(.) > Πe(.). If σe = σ
∗, then σi ∈ [σ
∗, 1] and we have
π(σe, σi) = σi [σ
∗a+ (1− σ∗)c] + (1− σi) [σ
∗b+ (1− σ∗)d]
≤ π∗
and
π(σi, σe) = σi [σ
∗a+ (1− σ∗)b] + (1− σi) [σ
∗c+ (1− σ∗)d]
≥ π∗
20
for any σi ∈ [σ
∗, 1] (with equalities for σi = σ
∗). The expected fitness of
the entrant cannot be higher than that of the incumbent. If σe = σ¯, then
σi ∈ [0, 1] and we have
π(σe, σi) = π(σ¯, σi)
= σi [σ¯a+ (1− σ¯)c] + (1− σi) [σ¯b+ (1− σ¯)d]
= σi π
∗ + (1− σi) [σ¯b+ (1− σ¯)d]
≤ σi π
∗ + (1− σi) [σ¯b+ (1− σ¯)d]
= π∗
with equality if and only if σi = 1. However, then we have
π(σi, σe) = σ¯a+ (1− σ¯)b
> σ¯a+ (1− σ¯)c
= π∗.
The expected fitness of the entrant never exceeds that of the incumbent.
With this population the outcome induced by (σ∗, σ∗) is therefore stable.
viii) c > b > π∗ > a > d: Consider a monomorphic population of types
T (0, σ∗, σ¯, 1) with the following best-response correspondence:
β0,σ∗,σ¯,1(σ) =


1 if σ > σ¯ + η
[0,1] if σ = σ¯ + η
[0, σ∗] if σ = σ∗
0 if σ < σ¯ + η and σ 6= σ∗
,
where η ≡ σ¯−σ¯2 > 0. As c > b we know from above that σ
∗ < σ¯ <
σ¯ + η. Hence, there is a type with this best-response correspondence in
our type space. For, β(σ) is non-empty and convex for all σ ∈ [0, 1], we
have σ∗ ∈ β(σ∗), and the closed graph criterion is also satisfied (β is upper
hemi-continuous). Consider any entrant in the population such that in b¯ the
equilibrium which is played between an entrant and an incumbent is (σe, σi)
and the equilibrium between two entrants is (σ3, σ3). The expected fitnesses
of the incumbent and the entrant are, respectively,
Π0,σ∗,σ¯,1((1− ǫ) T (0, σ
∗, σ¯, 1) + ǫ T (e) | b¯) = (1− ǫ) π(σ∗, σ∗) + ǫ π(σi, σe),
and
Πe((1− ǫ) T (0, σ
∗, σ¯, 1) + ǫ T (e) | b¯) = (1− ǫ) π(σe, σi) + ǫ π(σ3, σ3).
If σe < σ¯ + η and σe 6= σ
∗, then σi = 0. Hence,
π(σe, σi) = σe b+ (1− σe) d
< (σ¯ + η) b+ (1− σ¯ − η) d
< σ¯ b+ (1− σ¯) d
= π∗.
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If σe > σ¯ + η, then σi = 1. Hence,
π(σe, σi) = σe a+ (1− σe) c
< σ¯ a+ (1− σ¯) c
= π∗.
If σe = σ¯ + η, then σi ∈ [0, 1] and we have
π(σe, σi) = π(σ¯ + η, σi)
= σi [(σ¯ + η)a+ (1− σ¯ − η)c] + (1− σi) [(σ¯ + η)b+ (1− σ¯ − η)d]
< σi [σ¯a+ (1− σ¯)c] + (1− σi) [σ¯b+ (1− σ¯)d]
= π∗.
In either case, we can find a sufficiently small ǫ′ > 0 such that for all ǫ ∈
(0, ǫ′) we have Π0,σ∗,σ¯,1(.) > Πe(.). If σe = σ
∗, then σi ∈ [0, σ
∗] and we have
π(σe, σi) = σi [σ
∗a+ (1− σ∗)c] + (1− σi) [σ
∗b+ (1− σ∗)d]
≤ π∗
and
π(σi, σe) = σi [σ
∗a+ (1− σ∗)b] + (1− σi) [σ
∗c+ (1− σ∗)d]
≥ π∗
for any σi ∈ [0, σ
∗] (with equalities for σi = σ
∗). The expected fitness of
the entrant never exceeds that of the incumbent. With this population the
outcome induced by (σ∗, σ∗) is therefore stable. 2
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